Subordinate Commentary
:thumb:
Triplex:
The VIRGINIAN's triplex was a steam compound 2-8-8-8-4, NOT an electric locomotive. They also
operated 2-10-10-2s that had the largest (low
pressure) cylinders on any locomotive to serve
on this continent. Unlike their triplex, the
2-10-10-2s had lesser problems with engines'
parts wear, and making adequate steam to get
over the road. So they lasted longer than any
ones triplexes.
For what it is worth the MoPac bought
compound 2-8-8-2s for similar service as
the VIrginian's behemoths. Namely as
banking engines (a/k/a pushers), to shove
the hills. One was ordered (I believe #4000 or
5000) with multiple auxiliary locomotive
engines for both tender bogies (a/k/a trucks).
Auxiliary locomotives (a/k/a booster engines),
were mostly based upon Bethlehem Steel
or Franklin Railway Appliance models. This
MoPac 2-8-8-2 (+ 6 +6) was in fact a unique
animal. To whit, a four engined locomotive;
a QUADRUPLEX in other words. Like the
triplexes the extra boosters made the
MoPac's locomotive more a headache than
a boon.
Probably, better quality of care in places
where wages were a lower portion of operating
expenses could have made all of these more
complex locos viable.
The VIRGINIAN 2-10-10-2s , like the
one group of ERIE mallet's that did work well
(their Wootten system 0-8-8-0s), soldiered
on providing low speed muscle shoving
trains over the Blue Ridge, and Pocono grades
respectively, for many years.
For what it is worth, since someone brought
it up, the Confederacy was not more handicapped
than the USA in the Civil War by gauge
differences. The largest and most modern
railroads was the ERIE, at the time. It was
a six ft. gauge railroad (as was the Lackawanna),
that connected with the six ft. gauge M&O
at Cincinnati.
So there was no interface of equipment with any "standard" gauge lines by the extensive system
of six feet railroads.
Ohio was covered with a maze of lines which
were built to "Ohio" gauge. This was
deliberately set at a non-standard gauge by
the legislature in Columbus to force rail
lines coming into the state to have to break
bulk, if they wanted state assistance.
Most, after the initial lines came, did need it.
This was because buying rights of way at
fair prices quickly became impossible;
without the use of the state's power of
eminent domain to force the sale of property
and judicially set equitable prices.
Erie, Pennsylvania would not let any
line coming into the city connect directly
to another railroad in order to preserve all
the jobs involved in breaking bulk there.
Richmond, Virginia had similar laws for
similar reasons. They were not alone
in indulging in this sort of municipal
job preservation and creation all over
the country.
The burdens of inability to interchange
freight cars was not sectionally biased.
Read Rogers book on the railroad networks
development in the 19th century, or
see Bianculli's volume 2 in his TRAINS and
TECHNOLOGY; in the Nineteenth Century.
There also was a cultural and systemic bias
against interchange of freight. That boils
down to lack of organization to administer
such a system, at the time the war broke out.
There are many facets to the latter matter,
but this is not the time or place to go into
it, because few care about these details. I
do hope these comments are helpful anyway.
Good-Luck, Peter Boylan